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MORAL THEORY AND MORAL LIFE
One of Shakespeare's plays mentions
Young men, whom
Aristotle thought
Unfit to hear moral philosophy. 1
Aristotle is well known for saying that moral
philosophy is not for the young. In fact, he doesn't
think it is for many adults either. The many, as he
puts it, "do not abstain from bad acts because of
their baseness but through fear of punishment." If
Aristotle is right about this, what can philosophy
say to the many?
For Aristotle, as well as many others,
moral philosophy (or ethics) is a rather rarified
subject. Although it seeks to understand moral life
at its most fundamental level, supposedly only a
rather select group of thinkers is equipped to join
the search--these are philosophers, those whose
business it is to formulate, defend, and critique
moral theories.
Today, however, this view is being
challenged from a variety of quarters.
Philosophers find themselves invited to sit down
with lawyers, doctors, nurses, social workers,
engineers, business managers, and many others to
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talk about ethics. Ethics centers are cropping up
in colleges and universities across the country--
including here at Western Michigan University.
Ethics is a "growth industry," and philosophers
seem to be on the leading edge.
Now, this has to make those who share
Aristotle's view of moral philosophy a little
uneasy. Here is a clear invitation to widen
philosophy's audience; but how can philosophy
deliver the goods if moral philosophy is as difficult
a subject as Aristotle thinks and if, for most
people, the bottom line is, "Will I be punished?"
My answer is that those who side with
Aristotle on this matter are mistaken. They
exaggerate moral philosophy's inaccessibility. No
doubt there are parts of moral philosophy that are
relatively inaccessible--especially those parts
whose literature is addressed nearly exclusively to
professional philosophers. Some of this is not only
inaccessible, but also not terribly relevant to moral
life. However, there are large parts of moral
philosophy that are accessible--or they would be if
only philosophers would attempt to make them so.
This is the invitation lawyers, doctors, nurses,
engineers, social workers, accountants, journalists,
managers, and others are currently extending to
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philosophers. What should help those
philosophers willing to accept this invitation is the
fact that it isn't just philosophers who are quite
capable of rather sophisticated philosophical
reflection about morality. My own view is that
those who share Aristotle's view underestimate the
ability of those who have not heard "lectures on
moral philosophy" to understand whatever light
moral philosophy might shed on moral life. This
underestimation extends to children as well as
adults.
In any case, in recent years a growing
number of philosophers have accepted the
invitation from others to help them sort through
practical moral problems. I welcome this changing
role of moral philosophers ("ethicists"). However,
while this role is changing I think it is important to
pay close attention to the lessons that might be
learned ab.mrt philosophy, not just those that might
be learned frQm philosophy.
The best way I can clarify what I have in
mind is to launch into some autobiographical
remarks. I'm one of those professional
philosophers who has tried to bridge some of the
gaps between moral philosophy and the everyday
world in which we live. For the past couple of
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decades my work has focussed on four areas:
moral theory in the standard philosophical sense
(ethics); practical and professional ethics; moral
development; and the philosophical thinking of
children. I will say a little bit about each of these
interests of mine. For a time I thought of these as
four rather different areas of interest--united more
by the fact that Iwas interested in all of them than
that they are somehow connected with each other.
However, the 18th Century philosopher
Thomas Reid has been instrumental in helping me
see unity among the diversity of interests I've been
pursuing. I will cite a passage from Reid's Active
Powers ofthe Mind that I think underlies most of
what want to say in this talk:
By the name we give to it [the
theory of morals], and by the
custom of making it a part of every
system of morals, men may be led
into this gross mistake, which I
wish to obviate, that in order to
understand his duty, a man must
needs be a philosopher and a
metaphysician.2
Notice that Reid does not say that philosophical
reflection is not needed to understand one's duty--
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only that one need not be a philosopher and
metaphysician.
The importance of Reid's warning is
illustrated by one of my early forays into
professional ethics. In the summer of 1979 I
participated in a two week workshop on
engineering ethics at the Illinois Institute of
Technology. The workshop consisted of 12
engineering faculty, 12 professional philosophers,
and a small group of discussion leaders from
engineering, business, government, and
philosophy. The engineers were eager to find out
how they might introduce their students to ethics
in an engineering context. The expectation was
that philosophers (sometimes referred to as
"ethicists") could help. Engineers have "tools of
the trade". What philosophers' "tools of the trade"
might be helpful? the engineers asked. It was
rumored that, at the conclusion of a similar
institute a year before, the engineers presented
each philosopher with a plastic tool box filled with
plastic tools. Surely, the engineers in our group
admonished us, we could do better than those
philosophers!
As if to prove the point, a well-known
philosopher gave an opening lecture on moral
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relativism and moral absolutism. As he spoke, I
thought how helpful this would be for my
Introduction to Ethics students. Very nice. The
lecture concluded. Time for questions or
comments. The chair of the department of civil
engineering at one of the top engineering schools
in the country made the first comment: "What
were you talking about? I didn't understand
anythin~you said. What do all those 'isms' have to
do with engineering?" An overstatement--but one
with a point. Philosophers and engineers do not
talk the same language when they employ their
"tools of the trade." Our lecturer talked straight
philosophy, making no attempt to place his
remarks in an engineering context.
So, what is the solution to this problem?
One familiar to philosophers is to push harder at
trying to enlighten others about the "isms" that are
trademarks of the profession. My heretical view is
that this is starting at the wrong end. Trying to
frame moral problems in terms of the "isms" of
philosophy often comes at the price of not
understanding those problems well. I will illustrate
the danger with another example from the
engineering ethics workshop.
A famous engineering case study is the
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Goodrich Brake Scandal, as reported by Kermit
Vandivier, a technical writer for Goodrich in the
late '60s. Vandivier claimed that he and others
were told to falsify data about the testing of a new
brake system for Airforce jets. Ralph Gretzinger,
the test lab supervisor, was portrayed as caving in
to management's demand. At first he said he
would have nothing to do with it. In the end,
however, he changed his mind, citing the difficulty
of finding new employment at his age (42) and his
need to keep up his house payments and pay for
his children's college education.
~ is a problem in engineering ethics--no
doubt about it. How should it be characterized?
Philosophers may be tempted to bring an "ism"
into the discussion. In fact, this is just what a
well-known text on professional ethics does.
Chapter 1 is entitled "Egoism." It consists of the
Vandivier article plus readings from philosophers
Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Butler. Now, while I
admire these philosophers very much, it seems to
me their writings do not fit the example very well.
The selections focus on two questions. First, is all
human motivation fundamentally and inescapably
self-interested? An affirmative answer is called
psychological egoism. Second, is morality
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grounded exclusively in self-interest? An
affinnative answer is called ethical egoism.
How do these concepts relate to the
Goodrich case? Take Gretzinger's situation. A
plausible reading might go like this. His first
response is that it would be wrong to falsify the
data. But he is pressured from two directions. On
the one hand, his superiors are telling him he must
falsify the data. Bucking them means challenging
their authority, and he may wonder if he would be
disloyal. This may pose a lllill:a1 conflict for
Gretzinger. Does he have the right to refuse?
Although he may fear what will happen to him if
he refuses, this is by no means his only concern.
So far, self-interest, then, is only part of the
picture.
On the other hand, Gretzinger is concerned
about his home and his children. If he loses his
job, what will happen to them? It is disturbing that
Gretzinger never seems to ask whether risking a
pilot's life due to brake failure is a reasonable
trade-off for house payments and college tuition.
Even so, it takes several steps to show that his
concern for his children is just another fonn of
self-interest. Furthennore, Gretzinger may be
asking "Why be moral?" as much as "What's in my
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self-interest?"
At this point it might be objected that
Goodrich itself could be viewed in egoistic terms--
Goodrich the corporate egoist, willing to take
short-cuts in order to obtain lucrative contracts.
I don't reject the analogy out of hand. But it must
be noted that this is an analogy. Hobbes and
Butler are talking about human motivation, not
corporations. Furthermore, even if it can be
argued that a corporation can be a giant egoist, it
by no means follows that the individuals within the
corporation are similarly egoistic. In fact,
successful corporate egoism may depend on the
commitment of individuals within the corporation
being devoted to causes larger than themselves. I
may have to make considerable self-sacrifice in
order to do what is best for the corporation.
What does my objection to framing the
Goodrich case in terms of egoism come to? There
really are two problems. First, when we sort
through the moral issues the Goodrich case
actually raises, the relevance of self-interested
concerns is only one element. Second,
psychological and ethical egoism are both
reductive theories. Psychological egoism, for
example, takes the vast range of seemingly diverse
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springs of action under a unifying principle,
claiming they are all variations on the same theme.
Ethical egoism performs an analogous function in
moral thought. It is very easy for discussions of
such theories to take on life of their own--the
result being that the original ethical problems are
quickly forgotten.
A note on my own predilections. Perhaps
if I thought that egoistic theories themselves had
some credibility, I would take a more sanguine
view of their relevance to the practical issues.
However, I am not attracted to them. Pointing out
their shortcomings, however, does almost nothing,
as far as I can tell, to shed light on how the issues
should be resolved in the Goodrich case. For
example, Gretzinger's puzzlement is not about
whether self-interest trumps all else. It is about a)
what it is right to do in this situation and b)
whether he should do what is right, assuming he
knows what would be right.
I am not claiming that philosophical
reflection on egoism, utilitarianism, Kantianism or
the other 'isms' of moral philosophy are useless or
should be avoided. What I am questioning is their
immediate relevance to the problems of life--here
the problems of moral life. Trying to fit such
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"isms" on to the issues of moral life is, I think,
quite often a mistake-at least if it is done so at the
outset. My bias, if you like, is to have moral
theory be issue-driven rather than trying to place
issues in a procrustean bed framed by one's
favorite "ism".
But, the moral theorist may object, what
do you offer in place of the standard big three--
egoism, utilitarianism, and Kantianism? Without
a unifying grounding principle, doesn't everything
simply hang arbitrarily in the air? At this point
another "ism" rears its head. The alternative to a
comprehensive, unifying theory is intuitionism--
which supposedly advocates uncritical reliance on
ungrounded and, for all we know, arbitrary
"intuitions." W.D. Ross, a very sensible moralist
in the early part of this century, is often
caricatured as an intuitionist of this sort.
Ross adopted the pluralist view that there
are many sources of duty or obligation--fidelity,
reparation, gratitude, beneficence, self-
improvement, not injuring others, and so on. But
since he refused to arrange these hierarchically,
with one consideration grounding the rest, critics
charged him with incoherence. What happens
when these "intuitions" conflict? What if keeping
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a promise requires me to harm someone? Without
an overarching principle, critics complain, there is
no way of resolving such conflicts. So, Ross's
"intuitionism" seems to break down just when our
puzzlement arises.
There is not time to explore this issue in
detail here. I can only suggest an alternative
approach that, it seems to me, avoids denigrating
ordinary moral thought and at the same time
rejects the demand for an overarching theory.
Thomas Reid insisted that morality "is the business
of [everyone]; and therefore the knowledge of it
ought to be within the reach of all. ,,3 As I've
already mentioned, central to his view is that one
does not need to be a philosopher or
metaphysician to understand how one should
conduct oneself He did not mean that moral
reflection and systematic thinking are unnecessary.
Reid acknowledged that, for a variety of reasons,
even self-evident truths can escape our
understanding for our entire lives.
However, his point is that, although moral
systems, as he puts it, "swell to great magnitude,"
this is not because there is a large number of
general moral principles. He says that, actually,
they are "few and simple." Moral systems swell
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because applications of these principles "extend to
every part of human conduct, in every condition,
every relation, and every transaction of life. ,,4 If
this is right, then applyi",~ even a relatively small
number of principles is bound to be a complex
affair--especiaIlyas one's experiences broaden and
deepen.
To illustrate what Reid means, consider
Forest Carter's Little Tree, a six-year-old
American Indian child. S Little Tree notices a little
girl with no shoes and seemingly little else by way
of possessions. He tells his grandmother, who
makes some moccasins for her. Little Tree
presents the moccasins to the girl, much to her
obvious delight.
So far, so good. But the story now takes
a surprising tum. The little girl's father asks her
where she got the moccasins. She points to Little
Tree. Then the father whips her hard on the legs
and back with a switch, makes her take off the
moccasins, and he returns the moccasins to Little
Tree, saying: "We'uns don't take no charity ...from
nobody ...and especial heathen savages."6 Later
Little Tree's grandfather comments on the
episode:7
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On the trail, Granpa said he didn't
bear the sharecropper no ill. Granpa said
he reckined that pride was all he
had ...howsoever misplaced. He said the
feller figgered he couldn't let the little girl,
ner any of his young'uns, come to love
pretty things for they couldn't have them.
So he whipped them when they showed a
liking for things they couldn't have ...and he
whipped them until they learned; so that in
a little while, they knowed they was not to
expect them things.
What has Little Tree learned? That giving
to those in need is wrong? Hardly. What he has
learned is that one must pay careful attention to
the larger context in which giving takes place. In
some instances it may do more harm than good.
This may never have occurred to Little Tree
before. It was beyond his small world and, likely,
beyond his imagination. However, the lesson he
learned put together several things for him:
scarcity of goods, giving, kindness, the infliction of
pain, coping, and pride. He had some
understanding of each of these, but not in these
particular relationships to one another.
Little Tree also learned something else,
with broader implications. Little Tree recounts,
14
"Granpa said he didn't fault me fer not catching on
right off" His grandfather told him that he had the
advantage over Little Tree of having seen
something similar a few years earlier. He saw a
father whip two of his daughters when he saw
them looking at a Sears Roebuck catalog:8
Granpa said that feller took a
switch and whipped them young'uns 'till
the blood run out of their legs. He said he
watched, and the feller took the Sears
Roebuck catalog and he went out behind
the barn. He burned up the catalog, tore it
all up first, like he hated that catalog.
Granpa said then the feller set down
against the barn, where nobody could see
him, and he cried. Granpa said he seen
that and so he knowed. Granpa said ye
had to understand. But most people didn't
want to--it was too much trouble--so they
used words to cover their own laziness and
called other folks "shiftless."
So, Little Tree learned several things--that
things are not always what they seem; that one
might, nevertheless, be able to understand (which
is not necessarily to approve); and that we have a
tendency not to make the effort to understand.
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Thus, initially assuming others are (or should be)
like us, we may exaggerate the differences that we
first notice between ourselves and them. Little
Tree has also learned that, while helpfulness is
important, one may have to work hard at getting
that right.
It looks as though Little Tree has made
some moral progress. However, if we try to cast
this in terms of an absolutist perspective, we will
find it difficult to make sense of this. From the
absolutist perspective, Little Tree's understanding
is far from adequate. He has just learned that,
although giving is sometimes good, it may misfire
in quite serious and unfortunate ways. It is not
clear how general Little Tree's understanding is at
this point. If anything, he is now more cautious--
less likely to generalize too quickly, more likely to
want to examine the particular circumstances more
thoroughly. Yet, he does not necessarily have a
more general perspective from which to evaluate
his progress. Giving to others in need is still good,
but not unqualifiedly.
So, we might better say that Little Tree has
gained a lesson in critical thinking. His eyes have
been opened to new possibilities, and he now sees
his moral world somewhat differently. Normally
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commendable behavior (giving to one in need) has
proven to be problematic. Normally unacceptable
behavior (whipping a child--for accepting a gift!)
is seen as understandable, however flawed. Is
Little Tree now hopelessly confused? Has he lost
his footing because of this unexpected turn of
events? There is little reason to suppose either.
As narrator, Little Tree conveys the sense that he
has increased his understanding. It is not that
giving to others in need is not good; it is simply
not an unqualified good. This is because it can
bring harm with it.
As Little Tree and the rest of us try to give
our moral lives a semblance of order, Thomas Reid
offers some useful advice. He compares a system
of morals to "laws of motion in the natural world,
which, though few and simple, serve to regulate an
infinite variety of operations throughout the
universe. ,,9 However, he contrasts a system of
morals with a system of geometry:
A system of morals is not like a
system of geometry, where the
subsequent parts derive their
evidence from the preceding, and
one chain of reasoning is carried
on from the beginning; so that, if
17
the arrangement is changed, the
chain is broken, and the evidence is
lost. It resembles more a system
of botany, or mineralogy, where
the subsequent parts depend not
for their evidence upon the
preceding, and the arrangement is
made to facilitate apprehension and
memory, and not to give evidence.
All of this has important implications for
how we characterize moral development. On the
botanical model, access to ground level moral
understanding need not be an all or nothing affair.
Its range and complexity can be a matter of
degree. Understanding how different, ground
level moral considerations are related to one
another can be a matter for moral discovery (and
dispute) without our having to say that those
whose picture is incomplete have no understanding
of morality at its most fundamental level. I believe
it is important to keep this in mind when
addressing moral Issues in business, the
professions, and other applied areas. Philosophers
and non-philosophers alike can be expected to
contribute to the discussion at the deepest level.
It is also important to keep this in mind
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when discussing moral issues with children. I
want to say a bit more about this by mentioning
some of my work in Philosophy for Children. This
will complete the last link in the chain of my
interests I mentioned at the beginning of this talk.
I first began to explore the idea that
children are capable of serious philosophical
thinking in 1979 when I was invited to visit my
daughter's fourth grade class once a week to
discuss philosophical ideas. As I visited with other
fourth and fifth grade students, I discovered I had
vastly underestimated their interest in and aptitude
for philosophical thought. We had splendid
discussions about logical relationships, the
relationship between the mind and brain, whether
machines can think, whether all questions have
answers, the relationship between dreams and
reality, what we can know as distinct from merely
belief, what fairness is, and so on.10
Three things especially stood out for me in
my discussions with children. First, I was
impressed by the incredible range of philosophical
ideas they were able to explore with considerable
sophistication. Second, I was surprised at how
little I had to contribute myself Essentially my
role each time we met was to read a few
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paragraphs from philosophically suggestive
children's stories, and occasionally ask questions to
help facilitate discussion. Typically, my task was
to start the ball rolling and then step out of their
line of fire.
Third, although the discussions the children
engaged in were philosophically sophisticated,
none of the standard philosophical jargon was
introduced. We discussed metaphysical questions
but never used the word metaphysics. Instead we
talked about whether the mind is real, whether
everything that is real is in space, whether all
questions have answers, and the like. We
discussed epistemological questions but never used
the word epistemology. Instead, we talked about
what the difference is between knowing that
something is true and simply believing that it is
true, what counts as evidence, whether all good
reasons for believing something is true is evidence
in support of it, and the like. In fact, we didn't
even use the word 'philosophy.'
One thing that was very evident is that the
8-11 year olds with whom I exchanged ideas
already had a rather well developed sense of
fairness. Favoritism, taking more than one's fair
share, not taking turns, listening to only one side
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of the story, jumping to conclusions, and a host of
other examples are readily volunteered as kinds of
unfairness. These are staple fare in the lives of
children from a very early age on--in school, on
the playground, and within their family structures.
That young children, like the rest of us, may more
readily recognize unfairness in others than in
themselves does not mean that they do not
understand what fairness and unfairness are. That
they will later extend their conceptions of fairness
and unfairness to situations they cannot now
understand very well (e.g., taxation)--and that they
will discover conflicts with other fundamental
moral values--does not imply that they do not now
have access to morality at its most basic level.
William Damon (The Moral Child)ll cites
considerable evidence that children younger than
two are capable of sophisticated empathic
responses to the suffering and misfortune of
others. By age four many are able to distinguish
among moral, conventional, and prudential rules
using the same kinds of principles as adults.
Gareth Matthews (philosophy and the
Youna Child and Dialogues With Children)
provides a wealth of examples of children's moral
thinking. He emphasizes the importance of
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paradigms:
A young child is able to latch onto
the moral kind, bravery, or lying,
by grasping central paradigms of
that kind, paradigms that even the
most mature and sophisticated
moral agents still count as
paradigmatic. Moral development
is then something much more
complicated than simple concept
displacement. It is: enlarging the
stock of paradigms for each moral
kind; developing better and better
definitions of whatever it is these
paradigms exemplify; appreciating
better the relation between
straightforward instances of the
kind and close relatives; and
learning to adjudicate competing
claims from different moral kinds
(classically the sometimes
competing claims of justice and
compassion, but many other
conflicts are possible). 12
In a view like this, children as well as
adults can be acknowledged to share some ground
22
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level understanding of morality. And, although
adults may typically have the upper hand in regard
to breadth of experience and understanding, there
is no warrant for entirely excluding children from
the adult world of morality.
If the thought that young children might be
capable of imaginative and provocative moral
thought seems far-fetched, consider an example
provided by Matthews:
IAN (six years) found to his
chagrin that the three children of
his parents' friends monopolized
the television; they kept him from
watching his favorite program.
"Mother," he asked in frustration,
"why is it better for three people to
be selfish than for one?"13
Matthews suggests that this may be an incipient
challenge to utilitarian thought. At the very least,
it should be conceded that Ian has a rudimentary
grasp of two fundamental moral concepts: fairness
and selfishness.
I have tried to illustrate how my work in
professional and applied ethics, moral psychology,
and the philosophical thinking of children has
affected my work in philosophical ethics. I am not
necessarily opposed to attempts to construct
comprehensive, coherent moral theories.
However, I think this must be done with great
caution--and with a special eye on the reductive
qualities that typically are trademarks of the "isms"
that populate moral philosophy.
I suggest we follow Thomas Reid's advice.
He rejects those theories of morality that go
"beyond the common sense of mankind in
general," complaining that they "have made little
progress and rather have rendered a subject, clear
and obvious to the multitude, obscure and
doubtful by their philosophical subtleties." Moral
philosophy, he urges, should try to "strike the
minds of men with the importance of the subject
matter and move their hearts. ,,14
As for the proper role of theory, Reid says:
There is in Ethicks as in most
Sciences a Speculative and a
practical Part, the first IS
subservient to the last. IS
While Reid insists that "the practical Part of
Ethicks is for the most part easy and level to all
capacities," he does not underestimate the
obstacles to clear-headed thinking in our practical
circumstances:
24
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There is ... no branch of Science
wherein Men would be more
harmonious in their opinions than
in Morals were they free from all
Biass and Prejudice. But this is
hardly the case with any Man.
Mens [sic] private Interests, their
Passions, and vicious inclinations
& habits, do often blind their
understandings, and biass their
Judgments. And as Men are much
disposed to take the Rules of
Conduct from Fashion rather than
from the Dictates of reason, so
with Regard to Vices which are
authorized by Fashion the
Judgments of Men are apt to be
blinded by the Authority of the
Multitude especially when Interest
or Appetite leads the same Way.
It IS therefore of great
consequence to those who would
judge right in matters relating to
their own conduct or that of others
to have the Rules of Morals fixed
& settled in their Minds, before
26
they have occasion to apply them
to cases wherein they may be
interested. It must also be
observed that although the Rules
of Morals are in most cases very
plain, yet there are intricate and
perplexed cases even in Morals
wherein it is no easy matter to
form a determinate Judgement. 16
In his essay, "A Plea for Excuses," J.L.
Austin says of ordinary language that, while it may
not have the last word, we must remember that "it
is. the tim. word". 17 A similar remark might be
made about ordinary moral understanding.
Experience and reflection can correct, modify, or
add to the moral understanding that begins in
childhood, but Thomas Reid might say, it cannot
totally displace it. Even so, as he points out, when
it comes to morality, there's plenty of work to do--
more than enough for a lifetime.
Michael S. Pritchard
Western Michigan University
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Richard DeGeorge
University of Kansas
~o. 2,January, 1989
Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as
Much as Doctors and Lawyers?
James W. ~ickel
University of Colorado
~o. 3, February, 1989
Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care:
Is Society Sending a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
~eonatology, Kalamazoo, Michigan
~o. 4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology
~o. 5, May, 1989
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
Gilbert Geis
University of Califomia--Irvine
VOLUMEID
~o. 1, October, 1989
Surrogate Parenting: The Michigan Legislation
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director
ACLU Fund of Michigan
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No.2, December, 1989
Morality Versus Slogans
Bernard Gert
Dartmouth College
No.3, February, 1990
Ethical Reasoning and Analysis: The Elements
Martin Benjamin
Michigan State University
No.4, April, 1990
Women's Dilemma: Is it Reasonable to be
Rational?
Harriet Baber
University of San Diego
VOLUMEIV
No.1, July, 1990
Higher-Order Discrimination
Adrian M.S. Piper
Wellesley College
No.2, November, 1991
Television Technology and Moral Literacy
Clifford G. Christians
University of Illinois--Urbana
No.3, May, 1991
Virtue and the Health Professions
Janet Pisaneschi
Western Michigan University
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VOLUME V
No.1, November, 1991
Owning and Controlling Technical Information
Vivian Wei!
Illinois Institute of Technology
No.2, March, 1992
The Imperative to Restore Nature: Some
Philosophical Questions
Lisa Newton
Fairfield University
No.3, May, 1992
Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self-Respect
Jane Zembaty
The University of Dayton
No. 4, June, 1992
National Health Insurance Proposals: An
Ethical Perspective
Alan O. Kogan, M.D.
Kalamazoo, Michigan
VOLUME VI
No.1 & 2, November, 1992
Arguing for Economic Equality
John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland
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No.3 & 4, May, 1993
Reasonable Children
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
No.5 & 6, June, 1993
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas of
Managing Politically Sensitive Data
Sylvie C. Tourigny
Western Michigan University
vOLUMEvn
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No.1, September, 1993
Why Does Utilitarianism Seem Plausible?
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
No.2, November, 1993
Can We Share Ethical Views with Other
Religions?
Robert Hannaford
Ripon College
No.3, February, 1994
Narrative, Luck and Ethics: The Role of
Chance in Ethical Encounters, in Literature
and Real Life Experiences
Nona Lyons
University of Southern Maine
No.4, February, 1994
Human Rights in the Social Sciences
Erika Loeffler Friedl
Western Michigan University
vOLUMEvm
No.1, January, 1995
Michigan's Deadlocked Commission on Death
and Dying: A Lesson in Politics and Legalism
Joseph Ellin
Western Michigan University
No.2, February, 1995
Two Papers on Environmentalism
I: Environmental Ethics and Value in the World
John Post
Vanderbilt University
No.3, March, 1995
Two Papers on Environmentalism
II: Resources and Environmental Policy
Jan Narveson
University of Waterloo
No.4, August, 1995
Race Family and Obligation
The Manin Luther King Jr. Day Lecture
Rodney C. Roberts
University of Wisconsin
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VOLUMEIX
No.1, January, 1996
Civility in America
Brian Scrag
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics
Indiana University
No.2, May, 1996
A Thracian Charm and Socratic Teaching
Arlene W. Saxonhouse
University of Michigan
No.3, August, 1996
The Ethics Center: Tenth Anniversary
David H. Smith
Indiana University
and
Douglas Ferraro
Western Michigan University
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
Joseph Ellin
Western Michigan University
VOLUMEX
No.1, December 1996
Moral Theory and Moral Life
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
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Fall 1996 Schedule
September 17 Joannne Lynn,
M.D., M.A.,M.S.;
Prof. of Health
Care and Medicine;
George Washington
University Medical
Center
"llIusions of
Individual
Decision Making
Equity"
"TheChaliengefor
Physcians in End
of Life Care"
September 19 Nicholas Dixon,
Ph.D.; Prof. of
Philosophy; Alma
College
"The Morality of
Intimate Faculty-
Student
Relationships"
September 20 Nicholas Dixon
"The Adversary
36
Method in Law
and Philosophy"
October 8 Joseph Ellin,
Ph.D.; Prof of
Philosophy;Westem
MichiganUniversity
"Is Racial
PreferenceNaked?
AffinnativeAction
as Self-Imposed
Moral Principle"
October 17 Holly Sklar;
Author, Activist;
Boston
"Creating Peace
By Working for
Economic Justice"
Winnie Veenstra Peace Lecture
November 4 Dianne Vaughan,
Ph.D.; Prof of
Sociology; Boston
College
"The Challenger
Launch Decision:
The Ethical
Implications"
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November 8 Authur Kohrman,
M.D.; University of
Chicago
"From Baby K to
Baby Messenger:
Who Ought to be
Making These
Decisions?"
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